ABSTRACT According to data from the most recent inter-census period, some sub-Saharan African countries are now urbanizing very slowly. Actual decreases in the level of urbanization are rare, but have been recorded for Zambia (where counter-urbanization began in the 1980s) and Côte d'Ivoire and Mali (where there is evidence of counter-urbanization during the 1990s). Countries where urbanization levels are stagnating or increasing very slowly, especially when considering large and medium-sized towns, include Benin, Mozambique, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Niger. The East African situation is more mixed, but growth rates in many large centres are around or below the national rate. For many urban centres there is evidence of increased circular migration, which has reduced the contribution of in-migration to urban growth. These trends are largely the result of declining economic opportunities in many urban areas, refl ecting crises in urban poverty and livelihood insecurity.
I. INTRODUCTION
This short paper reviews a range of evidence on downward shifts in the growth of African urban settlements in different countries. While these have occurred within a broader international context of downward revisions in the growth rates and size of many large cities in low-and middle-income countries,
(1) these trends in some countries of sub-Saharan Africa need particular attention. This is because they are more marked, and imply economic problems and urban livelihood issues that are still too rarely fully recognized in policy circles, even if there is now more awareness of the seriousness of urban poverty. Above all, this note seeks to address the assumption that fl ows in migration to many African urban areas have not changed.
II. URBANIZATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The 2009 World Development Report, Reshaping Economic Geography, (2) emphasizes the positive contribution that cities and migration can make to development in poor countries and how there is evidence of this across the world. While I would fully support this position, it is necessary to 1. See, for instance, Satterthwaite, D (2002) , Coping with Rapid Urban Growth, RICS, Leading Edge Series, London; also Brockerhoff, M (1999) , "Urban growth in developing countries: a review of projections and predictions", Population and Development Review Vol 25, No 4, pages 57-778; Bocquier, P (2004) , "Analyzing urbanization in subSaharan Africa", in A Champion and G Hugo (editors), New Forms of Urbanization: Beyond the Urban-Rural Dichotomy, Ashgate, Aldershot, pages 133-150; and Bocquier, P (2005) , "World urbanization prospects: an alternative to the UN model of projection compatible with urban transition theory ", Demographic Research Vol 12, No 9, disaggregate the experiences of different regions. The signifi cant surges in urban-based employment that have accompanied the various experiences and experiments with economic liberalization in some Asian countries have generally not occurred in Africa. Rather, structural adjustment from the 1980s has brought formal employment stagnation or decline, and a massive increase in the scale of dependence on informal work, generally in very low-income jobs.
(3) Basically, the structural conditions affecting urbanization in much of contemporary sub-Saharan Africa are signifi cantly different from those in many other regions of the developing world, and thus its economic geography is being reshaped in different ways.
The following analysis focuses mainly on population growth in towns in the upper and middle levels of the urban hierarchies; there is marked variation in small and very small centres, which is beyond the scope of this short paper, although these trends are also very signifi cant.
(4) Where there is recent census evidence, it is becoming increasingly apparent that for very many urban areas, particularly in West Africa, recent growth has been only a little above, no different from, or even sometimes below, the national population growth rate. Therefore, such towns are not growing much faster, and occasionally more slowly, than rural populations: in other words, urbanization, as a demographic process whereby the urban share of a country's population is increasing over time, is slow or stagnating. Thus, the majority of growth in most towns is attributable to natural increase, which, for sub-Saharan African towns, is often very similar to, or occasionally higher than, rural rates. This can be shown individually for many countries, including Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania and Kenya,
Zimbabwe, (6) Côte d'Ivoire, Central African Republic and the DR Congo.
(7) Although urban fertility is lower, this is countered by lower death rates and youthful and fertile urban age profi les compared to rural areas, which boosts birth rates. Recent demographic health surveys in the 2000s (e.g. for Zimbabwe and Kenya, where there have been marked fertility falls) still indicate remarkably little difference between rural and urban crude birth rates in most (but not all) countries, but signifi cant differences in infant and child mortality rates, which remain the chief factor in determining overall death rates in most African countries, which suggests urban natural increase is often still as high or higher.
These demographic parameters mean that, as a general guide, the contribution of net in-migration to the growth of one town, or group of towns, can be assessed by comparing its growth to the national rate. This is the basis of the evaluations of urban growth shown in the last column of Table 1 , which collates a range of data on recent urban growth trends from 14 African countries. The rates are mainly calculated from censuses (see table notes). These are supplemented for Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Senegal by survey data from a large-scale migration project across the region covering 1988-1992 (NESMUWA -Network of Surveys on Migration and Urbanization in West Africa), which have been analyzed and reported by a group of French scholars.
(8) These studies have shown that net in-migration rates to many towns have slowed, and sometimes reversed, and they have also highlighted a downturn in Côte d'Ivoire's level of urbanization during the 1990s, from 46 per cent to 43 per cent.
Essentially these data speak for themselves. Across Africa there is accumulating evidence, beyond the case of Zambia where counter-urbanization was established in the 1980s, (9) that net in-migration to towns has slowed very signifi cantly. Actual counter-urbanization now also appears to have 
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taken place in Côte d'Ivoire and Mali.
(10) Net in-migration has become weak or negligible in most or all of the main urban centres in Benin, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal. The share of Niger's population in its 36 main towns with more than 8,000 residents in 2001 increased by only 1 per cent from 1988 to 2001, to 16 per cent. In Benin, the population share in towns with more than 10,000 residents in 2002 had increased by less than 1 per cent from 1992, from 38.2 per cent to 38.8 per cent. In Niger, Kenya and Tanzania, the capital cities are still experiencing strong net in-migration but the situation in other main towns is very mixed; Arusha however is clearly highly attractive to migrants. It is also worth noting that in Kenya and Tanzania, unusual defi nitions and re-defi nitions of "urban settlements" at the lower end of their urban hierarchies have rendered the overall urban growth rates and levels reported in their censuses extremely misleading (and exaggerated) in recent decades, so it helps to base assessments of growth trends on individual settlements. (11) In Uganda, the signifi cance of violent confl ict in driving in-migration to towns is evident for Gulu and Lira, but otherwise in-migration has been only a small, or negative, component of growth in the main towns. In Ghana, net urban in-migration was very moderate in the 1970s and early 1980s, and has become stronger since; yet it remains a minor component, except for Kumasi where growth has more than doubled to 5.5 per cent per year, compared to 3.4 per cent for Accra Metropolis. Such broad-brush analysis could obviously be refi ned for each country, with reference to local factors. For example, international migration from and to West African towns adds another layer of complexity that is not covered here but that is detailed in the studies based on the NEMSUWA project. (12) What are the implications of these trends? First, a city growing annually at 3 per cent or more is a major planning challenge, whether its growth is derived from migration or natural increase. Yet sometimes, it appears that such continued growth, mainly from internal demographic factors, misleads, for it is assumed that the appearance of new residential areas (often unplanned) must mean that the city is attracting (and keeping) large fl ows of in-migrants. However, there is no necessary connection with migration. Second, available evidence suggests that reductions in net inmigration as a component of growth in many towns are not primarily due to less mobility but, rather, to signifi cantly higher rates of circular migration, which has always been of great importance in sub-Saharan Africa, which have adapted and been reinforced by structural change. Such adaptations are mainly the result of very negative livelihood changes for most of the urban population for whom there is no economic safety net, if all else fails, except within the nexus of rural-urban linkages. This has been clear in Zambia and Zimbabwe and is suggested by survey data from a range of other countries.
(13) Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso also shows very signifi cantly that urban-rural migration streams there have become less, not more, age-specifi c, so many young people are among those leaving the cities. (14) Debates about such circulation are considered in Potts, (15) alongside a detailed examination of longitudinal evidence from the 1980s to the 2000s from Harare, Zimbabwe, about migration trends, which provide, in microcosm, an extreme example of how these shift in response to major changes in urban economies.
In crude terms, the message is that some African countries are now not necessarily becoming more urban, or only very slowly so, in the sense of a higher proportion of their total population living in large towns. The implications, in terms of understanding the nature of contemporary urban and rural livelihoods and economies, are very different from those where it is clear that urban economies are so attractive that their population growth is signifi cantly derived from in-migration from rural areas. It is crucial that policy makers and donors recognize the evidence from sub-Saharan Africa about current rural-urban and urban-rural migration trends, which are such important indicators of the crisis in urban poverty and livelihood insecurity in so many of its major urban settlements, and recognize the urgency of addressing these issues.
